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K A R E N  V I R A G  
Recently, I was given a copy of University of Leicester professor Dina Iordanova’s 
impressive new book on Balkan cinema, Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture 
and the Media. Among the many issues addressed in this excellent and far-ranging 
work are cross-cultural representations of the Balkans; the relationship of the 
Balkans to the European cultural sphere; the siege of Sarajevo, perhaps the most 
emblematic conflict of the recent wars; the (im)possibility of taking sides in 
armed conflict; images of women and minorities; and how all these things affect 
and are affected by Balkan film. The power of Cinema of Flames can be measured 
in its manifold effects: first, I began a near orgy of Balkan film watching. I had seen 
some of the films before but was prompted to re-evaluate them in light of a 
broader cultural and historical awareness. Further, I was inspired to rethink 
previous assumptions about the meaning of boundaries, belonging and the notion 
of the state; in other words, to discover what all is in a name. 
And I was reminded that east and west are not just points on a compass. 
 
G O  E A S T ,  Y O U N G  W O M A N ,  G O  E A S T  
Some time back in the 1980s, when I told a friend that I was going to Hungary for 
the summer, she asked with great puzzlement, “Why would you go there?” Her 
reaction struck me as odd, a trip to Europe in the summer, a pilgrimage to the 
continent that gave us Michelangelo and Bach being a normal rite of passage for 
many Canadian university students. It turned out that it was my choice of 
destination that perturbed her––the suspected rudeness of Eastern Europe could 
not compare with the known sophistication of Western Europe, and Hungary was 
not Italy or France, its ancient civilization, wonderful museums, cultured 
populace, and Bartok and Liszt notwithstanding. In those Iron-Curtain days, the 
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Western image of Eastern Europe was of a grey and soulless place, battered and 
beaten down, full of steroid-overloaded she-men, bread queues, peasants, poverty, 
and bellicose, irrational people. My friend’s misgivings aside, though, I proceeded 
with my first trip ever to Hungary, with a side-trip to Transylvania, the land of 
my paternal ancestors. It would be impossible to sum up that summer in a few 
words but suffice it to say that the trip was a good exercise in demystification 
(one of the chief benefits of travel and something from which my friend could 
have benefited). I saw much to admire and, though rural Transylvania was 
shockingly poor, I have also seen abysmal poverty in North America, notably in 
New York City and Los Angeles.  
So, now that the Cold War has ended and political upheavals have torn down 
the walls and curtains that demarcated the region, what is the status of the 
countries of the former Eastern bloc? Are they part of the real (Western) Europe 
now? For that matter, what is Europe, and is it still usefully divided according to 
points on the compass? Some former Eastern bloc countries seem to be on their 
way to a kind of rehabilitation, to use a loaded word, and have been somewhat 
successful in their quest for their return to the fold of Europe. Others, in 
particular the countries of the Balkan peninsula, many of whose lands have been 
savaged by bloody wars in the last decade, are still knocking on a door that no one 
is opening. So, is Europe a cultural homeland or an exclusive private club? If the 
latter, what is the password for admission? “Populist democracy”? “Euro”? “Free 
market”? “McDonald’s”? One thing is guaranteed––it certainly isn’t “Kosovo.” And 
herein lies the rub. The Balkan countries, specifically those of the former 
Yugoslavia, turn their gaze westwards, but the West is not looking back. Why? In 
a wide ranging, cross-cultural discussion, Cinema of Flames provides many 
thought-provoking answers to this question. 
 
E A S T  I S  E A S T  A N D  W E S T  I S  W E S T  A N D  N E V E R  T H E  
T W A I N  S H A L L  M E E T  
To a certain extent, mapping and geographical orientation are exercises in power 
(geo)politics and part of the deliberate and imposed creation of identity. A couple 
of illustrative cases from our own part of the world are, first, the construction of 
fences and borders on the North American continent dating back to the arrival of 
the first whites several hundred years ago. The native population, who had no 
concept of private ownership of land, must have been both appalled and terrified 
as the new arrivals gradually made their way across the frontier and began 
marking off parcels of prairie land with barbed wire (the first iron curtains?). And, 
second, the appearance, every few months or so, of an article in a newspaper 
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somewhere suggesting, with some accuracy perhaps, that Alberta has more in 
common historically, culturally and economically with the American West than it 
has with the industrial East of Canada, to which it is tied by the somewhat 
unnatural and arbitrary 49th parallel. Further, the very terms east and west are 
loaded: the former often being imaginatively associated with negative traits; the 
latter with whatever is morally and culturally superior––us, in other words.1 (And 
though we couldn’t navigate without them, east and west imply that there is a 
centre, a somewhat illogical notion on a round earth. East, or west, of what?)  
In any case, Europe has been no less subject to this imaginative mapping. 
According to Larry Wolff, the development of an anthropological perspective of 
Eastern Europe occurred during the Enlightenment and its mapping of civilization 
vs. barbarism (Wolff 1994). That is, Eastern Europe was an invention, and “[t]he 
work of invention lay in the synthetic association of lands, which drew upon both 
fact and fiction, to produce the general rubric of Eastern Europe. That rubric 
represented an aggregation of general and associative observations over a diverse 
domain of lands and peoples” (356). In other words, Eastern Europe, though it 
obviously consists of actual countries, is a cultural construct, the east (and its 
negative ties to non-Caucasian people, the Ottoman empire, decadence and Islam) 
purposely set into opposition to the west (and its positive ties to Caucasians, the 
Austro-Hungarian empire, probity and Christianity). 
For the modern day Eastern European, Western Europe signifies both a 
desired state of being and a cultural home. Iordanova identifies a scene from 
Istvan Szabo’s examination of mores during the twilight of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire, Colonel Redl (1985), as emblematic of the importance of this belonging. In 
the scene, the young Redl, a child of a mixed Ruthenian, Ukrainian and Hungarian 
family that has fallen on hard times, goes to the home of his aristocratic Hungarian 
friend. During dinner, he is told that he should learn French because it is just as 
important as learning to ride a horse––and from then on the film is “about 
admissibility, and about coming face to face with the European” (Ioradanova 29–
30). This desire to engage with the Western European on what the Eastern 
European considers common ground becomes one of the many themes of the 
cinematic practice of the last decade in the former Yugoslavia.   
The word Balkans refers to a large peninsula and a mountain range in 
southeastern Europe. According to the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, the cognate 
balkanize means to divide a country into small, mutually hostile units––not 
exactly a ringing endorsement for the region. The word Europe, on the other hand, 
has very different connotations (in a frivolous aside, an episode of the Seinfeld tv-
show has the title character, a young Jewish New Yorker, taking up the practice 
of carrying a leather bag. His friends mockingly call it a purse. Embarrassed and 
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feeling emasculated, he defends himself, shouting “It’s not a purse. It’s European!”). 
In other words, Europe stands for elegance, but also for all the values that we hold 
dear; it is “the cultural and socio-economic entity which overlaps approximately 
with the values that are believed to provide the basic principles for cultural and 
social life ... democracy, freedom of expression, free speech, respect for human 
rights, individualism. But most of all it is synonymous with prosperity and power 
that ensure respect” (Iordanova 31). That is, Europe is more than fashion––it is 
refinement and sophistication, efficiency and order, a cultivated rosebush in the 
overgrown jungle that is the rest of the world. 
Yet even a cursory examination of historical maps will show that Europe is 
not a fixed entity. Borders change rapidly as wars rage and empires rise and fall. A 
friend’s father lived in Poland and Russia––without changing addresses. The land 
of my own paternal Hungarian ancestors is now part of Romania. All of this 
change inevitably leads to the problems of inclusion and exclusion, and shifting 
national allegiances, not to mention nationalist tensions. Geographically the 
Balkans are part of Europe, and national histories and ideologies, which depict the 
area as the bridge between the Occident and the Orient, re-enforce this sense of 
belonging (Iordanova 32).2 Culturally, citizens of the Balkans feel an innate 
connection to Europe––a Muslim Sarajevan character in Shot Through the Heart, 
an HBO production, when faced with the possibility of a civil war, exclaims, 
“This is Sarajevo, not Somalia. We are Europeans for God’s sake!” Instead, 
Sarajevo, like Beirut, “became a city-martyr” (Iordanova 235). Likewise a character 
from Boro Draskovic’s Vukovar fervently cries that the world won’t let Yugoslavia 
descend into chaos—in actuality, that city was ruthlessly reduced to utter rubble 
by Serbian forces. Countless other actual events of the Balkan upheavals in the last 
decade showed how wrong these fictive protestations were, yet Europe remained 
almost passive about the fate of the area, even when it was revealed that 
concentration camps had made their ugly return to European soil for the first time 
since the Second World War.3 
The past ten years have seen overtures on the part of many former Eastern 
bloc countries to return to the European fold. Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary have joined NATO, and all have applied to become part of the 
European Union (EU). Iordanova notes that Slovenia and Croatia in particular do 
not want to be associated with the Balkans and their governments have issued 
state documents to this effect (Iordanova 34). This wish to avoid identification 
with the Balkans signifies a number of things: the perceived superiority of 
Western Europe, a renunciation of any ties to the Orient (and of Islam), a 
valorization of Catholicism, a renunciation of former neighbours and countrymen, 
a rising sense of national identity and a reorientation of the gaze towards the 
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West. In the broader picture, the very names Eastern and Central Europe have 
been reconceptualized, and no less than the American army now considers the 
former category outdated: the correct terms are now Central Europe and the 
Balkans (Iordanova 41–42). So, the former Eastern bloc has been rehabilitated; the 
Balkans are still on the periphery. 
 
I F  Y O U ’ R E  N O T  W I T H  U S ,  Y O U ’ R E  A G A I N S T  U S  
In these days of polarized politics with wanted-dead-or-alive frontier justice being 
foisted on the world by the Bush administration in its so-called war on terrorism 
(how could any reasonable person be in favour of terrorism?), the questions arise: 
Can one not take sides? Is refusing to take sides actually taking a side? What 
responsibility do we have to our families, friends and culture and how does that 
responsibility relate to personal ethics? For his stated desire in the early 1990s to 
stay unaligned, Bosnian Muslim director Emir Kusturica was harshly criticized and 
labelled a “Yugo-nostalgic,” a category that described a number of intellectuals 
who refused to take sides (Iordanova 121). Kusturica, the best known of the ex-
Yugoslavian filmmakers, has made a number of films which have garnered 
international attention, among them When Father Was Away on Business (1985), 
The Time of the Gypsies (1989), Black Cat, White Cat (1998) but his most 
(in)famous work is the controversial Underground, a complicated and highly 
politicized film (the latter trait always difficult for North American audiences). 
Though it won the Palme d’Or at Cannes in 1995, Underground caused an 
international storm of criticism about Kusturica’s political beliefs and alliances 
that eventually prompted him to announce his retirement from filmmaking (an 
announcement that was later retracted.)  
Underground follows the life of three protagonists—Marko, a cunning 
opportunist; Natalia, an equally opportunistic actress; and Blacky, a bellicose 
fool—and it mirrors events in Yugoslavia’s history. In part one, “War,” it is April 
6, 1941, and the Nazis are bombing Belgrade. Marko leads a group of friends and 
family to a large cellar for shelter, but does not enter himself. Instead, he and 
Blacky go above ground and commit a series of robberies, which they pretend are 
acts of patriotism, then Marko convinces Blacky to return to the cellar while he 
remains above ground. In part two, entitled “Cold War” and set in the early 1960s, 
Marko has become a beloved national poet and has married Natalia. And though 
it is over 20 years later, the people are still hiding in the cellar. Occasionally, 
Marko plays recordings of battle sounds to them as proof that the Nazis are still in 
power and that it is too dangerous to surface. Meanwhile, he and Natalia use them 
as slave labour to manufacture arms that Marko sells on the black market. During 
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a raucous underground wedding, the walls of the cellar crumble and reveal a series 
of tunnels running to the West in which streams of people are trying to escape. 
Blacky and his son go above ground but the son is killed and Blacky is captured by 
the police. Meanwhile Marko blows up the house and the armaments factory. The 
third part, also called “War,” is set in the early 1990s on a battlefield in an 
undisclosed location. Marko and Natalia are still immoral black marketeers, selling 
arms to whoever will buy them. Blacky is a paramilitary commander. Marko’s 
long lost brother appears. He realizes what Marko has done and beats him to 
death; the military forces shoot Natalia and set the two bodies on fire. Blacky 
bangs his head against an upside down crucifix as he watches the bodies of his 
former friends burn. 
All does not end there, however; the film contains a utopian epilogue—a 
wedding attended by all the dead protagonists. As they celebrate on a beautiful 
bright day on the shores of the Danube, so much in contrast to the pervasive 
darkness of the rest of the film, the bit of land they are on breaks off, and as they 
continue to dance and sing, their little island floats away down the river to an 
unknown destination. Iordanova tells us that this final scene was the main image 
that “screenwriter Kovacevic and Kusturica had in mind all along ... the authors 
were determined to use this particular scene as the defining metaphor for 
Yugoslavia” (Iordanova 114). According to Kusturica: 
They go away without knowing what has happened to them. That is the way of the 
Balkan people. They never rationalize their past. Somehow the passion that leads them 
forward is not changed. I hope some day people may find better ways to use the passion 
they have so far persistently used to kill one another. (Kusturica in Robinson, 1996, 12, as 
cited in Iordanova, 115) 
Kusturica was roundly criticized for abandoning Sarajevo when it needed him 
most, for producing propaganda for the Serbs in the form of Underground and for 
playing the enfant terrible, whose artistic nature imbues him with a special moral 
code that absolves him of moral responsibility, rather like the one on display in 
The Wonderful, Horrible Life of Leni Riefensthal (1993). Iordanova admits that 
Underground could not have been made anywhere but Belgrade, but she also 
asserts that “[m]aking movies in Belgrade when you have a choice of making them 
somewhere else is taking sides” (129). 
The issue of partisanship is fictively explored in Milchovi Manchevski’s Before 
the Rain. In this film, Aleksander is a Macedonian photographer who has been 
living in London. On assignment, he had a brutalizing experience in which a man 
is shot simply to provide him with a photograph. Though he didn’t will the 
shooting, he profited from it and has done much soul-searching about his 
culpability in the incident and about what it means to take sides. He decides to 
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return to his village in Macedonia but finds it much changed. Whereas previously 
its Orthodox and Muslim populations co-existed peacefully, the village is now 
divided and violence is brewing. In a non-linear narrative that only comes together 
at the end, an Albanian Muslim girl, the daughter of an old friend, kills an 
Orthodox Macedonian relative of Aleksander’s with a pitchfork when he tries to 
rape her. Alexander discovers that his family is holding the girl and is planning to 
kill her. He will not have any part of this barbarity and tries to help her escape. 
His family shoots him. The girl manages to get away but is later killed by her 
family when she tries to leave with a young Macedonian Christian, Aleksander’s 
nephew.  
Much of the controversy that erupted in Europe over Underground and, to a 
lesser extent, Before the Rain is probably lost on North American audiences, 
which have at best a vague knowledge of the intricacies of Balkan politics, and 
which are also quite likely to consider the characterization of Balkan events as 
uncontrollable and brutal to be perfectly natural and accurate. This is confirmed 
by Iordanova, who notes that Western audiences perceived Underground as “a 
gargantuan metaphor of the messy state of Balkan affairs rather than as a finely 
crafted propagandistic insinuation that would work in favour of one of the 
warring sides” (118). She also comments on the basic level of ignorance of 
Western critics: “Underground was consistently described by Western critics as a 
Bosnian movie, even though the film was a French, German and Hungarian 
production, shot in Prague, Belgrade and Plovdiv, set in Belgrade, dealing with 
Serbs and Croats, and not touching directly on anything Bosnian” (118). Many 
European critics (e.g., Cerovic 1995) saw Underground as a capitulation to and 
collaboration with Serb aggression, which was especially embittering because 
Kusturica is from Sarajevo, the city that came to symbolize the worst excesses of 
Serbian aggression. This criticism was made more pointed by the fact that the film 
was made at a time when Serbia was largely viewed as the aggressor in the wars 
that ensued after the breakup of Yugoslavia (Iordanova 116).  
For his part, Kusturica disavowed any responsibility other than that of 
realizing an artistic vision (as Klaus Maria Brandauer’s apolitical Nazi-collaborating 
character shouts at the end of Szabo’s Mephisto, “What do you want from me? I 
am only an actor!”). Iordanova informs us that, in a strange (and, one hopes, 
unintentional) parody of actress Sally Field’s embarrassing 1985 Oscar acceptance 
speech when she exclaimed tearfully, “You like me. Right now, you like me!”, 
Kusturica accepted his 1995 Palme d’Or by saying, “There is only one reason for 
me to make movies. To be loved by you!” (thus sowing, as did Field, the seeds of  
animosity). Still, that some artists claim to have a special right to be morally and 
ethically disengaged in their quest to realize their artistic vision is not a new 
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notion. Though many of Kusturica’s peers simply refused to talk about it, Srdjan 
Dragojevic, director of Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, publicly defended Kusturica, 
saying that he, Kusturica, had done the right thing, that it is not necessary to 
choose one side in a conflict. “If you do that,” he said, “you stop being an artist” 
(cited in Iordanova, 128). 
 
I  H A V E  S E E N  T H E  O T H E R  A N D  H E  I S  U S  
Though the notion of the “other” is well-worn among academics, it is nevertheless 
a useful one, and it lies at the heart of much of what Iordanova says about the 
perception of the Balkans in the West. The creation of a state of Otherness 
implies a number of things: a certain physical distance; an oppressed gaze and a 
privileged one; a difference in economic standards; a means to dehumanize (this 
can come in the form of the other culture being represented as less advanced, less 
sophisticated, physically unattractive, descended from the wrong group); and a 
difference in language hierarchy, for example a Slavic language in contrast with a 
Romance or Germanic language (as we saw in Colonel Redl). And the 
collaboration of those from the Other side can’t hurt either. For Slavoj Zizek, this 
is what both Kusturica and Manchevski do in their films. According to him they 
exhibit a case of “balkanism”; that is, they provide a timeless space, a kind of 
tabula rasa upon which the West can, à la Said, project its imaginative myths: 
Together with Milche Manchevski’s Before the Rain, Underground is the ultimate 
ideological product of Western liberal multiculturalism: what these two films offer to the 
Western liberal gaze is precisely what this gaze wants to see in the Balkan war—the 
spectacle of a timeless, incomprehensible, mythical cycle of passions, in contrast to the 
decadent and anemic Western life. (cited in Iordanova 130) 
There is no doubt that many structures uphold and perpetuate mythical concepts 
of Others and that the group in question often helps to popularize negative 
stereotypes. These structures can be as sophisticated as non-linear-narrative art-
house films made by accomplished filmmakers, or as simple as urban-myth-like 
stories and jokes. I recently saw a television interview with an elderly Hungarian 
man who said that if one enters a revolving door ahead of a Hungarian, the 
Hungarian always manages to come out ahead. In other words, Hungarians are 
pushy, sneaky and untrustworthy. A close Italian-Canadian acquaintance exhibits 
much pride when his Italian heritage is linked with the Mafia; for him, it means 
that his “culture is to be taken seriously.” It is not uncommon for people to repeat, 
build upon, embellish and become complicit with negative stereotypes about 
themselves, as though self-denigration helps them claim a place in a valorized 
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narrative, even though it is not their own. Another Italian, Antonio Gramsci, gave 
this a name, of course: hegemony. 
For Iordanova, whether or not Underground is pro-Serbian propaganda is up 
for debate. What is more problematic is that, with Underground, Kusturica 
performs the moral equivalent of the Hungarian-in-the-revolving-door trope 
because he “ultimately attributes [the immorality of the characters in 
Underground] to impaired moral standards innate in the Balkan social character, an 
approach which is nothing else but a refined version of the primordialist 
argument, according to which the passions being played out in the Balkan conflict 
are of a pre-moral level” (119). 
I must admit that I found Underground mesmerizing. When I first saw it, I had 
heard of Kusturica, of course, but knew little about him. It was not until I began 
reading critical reactions from the European critics and Iordanova that I 
recognized the political implications of the film, which, for a Canadian with an 
interested layman’s knowledge of the Balkans, seemed to be largely about the 
problems inherent in a repressive communist regime. At that time, I was unaware 
that Kusturica was a Bosnian Muslim, but if the author is merely a cultural 
construct it really shouldn’t matter, should it? Clearly it does in this case, nicely 
illustrating that the author (or director) isn’t so dead after all.4  
As for Before the Rain, I am tempted to view it as a cautionary tale, not meant 
to specify a particular group or region but to show the tragedies, small and large, 
that arise from ethnic conflict, which can happen anywhere on earth. Indeed, 
Manchevski’s stated purpose in making the film was to explore violence and 
intolerance and not to point to Macedonia in particular (Iordanova 78). And in 
the face of the prevalence of violence in the world, it seems a bit unjust to ascribe 
a greater capacity for it to the Balkans, as though genocide were something the 
Serbs or Croats thought up. The names Cambodia, Rwanda, Armenia and the 
Spanish Inquisition happen to spring to mind here, not to mention the thought 
that not so long ago one of the great cultures of Western Europe tried to make 
soap out of an entire race of people. As the well-travelled writer Paul Bowles, 
who knew a thing or two about violence and being the Other, noted, “As far as I 
can see, people from all corners of the earth have an unlimited potential for 
violence” (from an interview in Paris Review, 1981, cited in Prose, 62). 
 
F R O M  T H E  O U T S I D E  L O O K I N G  I N  
Many Balkan films (for example, Zorba the Greek (1964); Ulysses’ Gaze (1995), 
Welcome to Sarajevo (1997)) show outsiders entering the Balkan space and reacting 
to the unfathomable, slightly uncivilized people they meet there. This view of the 
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visiting foreigner, expressed through selected images, has helped to shape Western 
attitudes towards the Balkans, thus working against the full acceptance of the 
Balkans into the European space. The Balkans are frequently represented as 
exotic, dark, barbarous, untamable, and cultural and media images reinforce these 
attitudes. Think of the enduring strength of vampire mythology so closely 
associated with Eastern Europe; filmically, think of the enigmatic, wild character 
of Zorba in Zorba the Greek, who acts as the perfect foil to the curious, yet 
rational, Englishman. Though based on a 1946 novel by Greek writer Nikos 
Kazantzakis and a script by Cypriot Michael Cacoyannis, the film version of Zorba 
the Greek departs from the novel and is essentially about an outsider’s view of the 
wild and passionate Balkan character. All of Zorba’s actions are filtered by the 
Englishman, who, in the end, though greatly affected by his relationship with 
Zorba, nevertheless returns to a certain future in England, while the character 
Zorba is almost forgotten, having acted entirely as a cipher for the other.  
Welcome to Sarajevo, perhaps the best known Western commercial film about 
the Balkans, concerns a British journalist in Sarajevo who, though he tries to 
remain impassive, takes pity on a young girl he meets in an orphanage and takes 
her back to England to live with his family. When he later learns that the girl’s 
mother is actually still alive, he returns to Bosnia to arrange for her adoption. At 
first, the mother (who must perforce abjectly admit to being a bad mother in the 
best politically correct tradition) refuses to sign the adoption papers. Finally, she 
phones her daughter in England. The girl refuses to speak Bosnian; then, in a final 
break with her downtrodden homeland, she tells her mother, “This is my home.” 
The mother immediately signs the papers. Iordanova suggests that, instead of 
empathizing with the characters in this film, Welcome to Sarajevo keeps the 
“viewer alienated and relies on Brechtian type of rational moral judgement rather 
than on mechanisms of identification of compassion” (240). And, certainly, a film 
that centres around foreign journalists in a war-torn country both impairs an 
audience’s ability to empathize with those who are really suffering and privileges 
the story of those who are not.  
Though Welcome to Sarajevo is problematic in its simplifying of complicated 
political situations, its Westerner-to-the-rescue ethos and its blatant grab for 
commercial appeal, I maintain that there is often value in seeing oneself through 
others’ eyes—it is one of the benefits of travel, surely, and also one of the 
functions of psychologists and counsellors, who provide a stranger’s dispassionate 
view to cast new light on others’, often too introspective, often obscure, 
motivations. And the Other can do much to illuminate and to universalize our 
own particular problems. A case in point is Ulysses’ Gaze, Theo Angelopoulous’s 
masterful 1995 work shows a Greek-American played by Harvey Keitel, returning 
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to Greece in search of some early film footage by the legendeary Manakis 
brothers. His quest leads him in a kind of timeless, placeless wandering through 
the Balkans, where he ends up in war-torn Sarajevo. In Ulysses’ Gaze, “nostalgia is 
meaningless, and all that remains is the longing for something that is impossible to 
attain. In the context of this existential pessimism, Balkan troubles are seen as 
problems of the world, as part of the tiresome recognition of its deterioration” 
(Iordanova 106–07). 
 
I D E N T I T É  F I X E  
So, then, who is allowed to represent and talk about whom? Can we only talk 
about ourselves? If so, doesn’t this suggest that there is a correct point of view? 
Can non-native W. P. Kinsella really write about First Nations’ issues? Can men 
truly represent women? Can Jews speak from a Palestinian point of view and vice 
versa? Can whites make films about blacks? (Spike Lee doesn’t think so). Can, 
should, a Bosnian Muslim speak for and about Serbs? These questions lead one to 
ponder the notion of identity and its fixedness. A common misunderstanding of 
poststructuralist theory is that everything from gender to identity is a construct 
and nothing has any meaning. If this were true, theorists would be doing a great 
disservice to people killed in wars, which are definitely not constructs, and, 
further, would be denying people’s emotional and spiritual attachments. It would 
be far too easy an out and not a very useful way to look at national, racial or 
religious conflicts. Despite what many undergraduates believe, theory is not our 
enemy; rather, we should use its insights to illuminate and reveal processes of 
control and identity formation, which are at constant work. These processes 
include many things: forms of government, class structure, economic forces, 
expressions of popular culture, and history, the last being one of the more 
problematic as it entails the making of defining national myths and is so easily 
manipulated, so easily burned, banned and rewritten. Living in a young country 
full of many immigrants, I have relatively few national historical signposts that 
help me understand who I am, no big defining battles for independence, though 
there is the war of 1812, which Canadians often invoke in a kind of manufactured 
‘I-am-Joe-and-I-am-Canadian’ nationalist manifesto. People in more ancient 
cultures have much more myth-making to contend with. But, no matter where 
one is, the manipulation of history and national mythologies has long been an 
effective way for regimes to manufacture specific actions, thought and consent, to 
typecast people in their own minds with a particular, unique and fixed identity. 
Yet, considering identity as a fixed, essential quality can lead to deep-seated 
personal and national mythologies that allow no room for self-criticism, and that, 
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in hearkening back to a time that never was, petrify history and solidify character. 
In the case of the Balkans, and Serbia in particular, the battle of Kosovo in 1389, a 
date often hailed as a turning point in the creation of the Serbian state, seems to 
be an event that has helped establish a notion of a fixed Serbian identity. As 
Bakic-Hayden notes, the problem is that “[t]he implication is that the ‘real’ 
identity of persons or groups is to be found in the pre-Yugoslav past” (923). The 
notion of a fixed historical identity, then, is another way of creating a voiceless, 
dehumanized Other, denying dissention, marginalizing minority groups and stifling 
cultural development.  
Very often the result of this is war. 
 
T H E  C I R C L E  I S  N E V E R  R O U N D  
This paper began by posing some questions about what it means to be part of 
Europe and discussing the boundaries of that continent, which, with the 
expansion of the EU, could change from day to day. A recent National Post article 
(March 23, 2002) reports that the new country of Serbia and Montenegro (which 
was the remnant of what was left of Yugoslavia after the recent wars) expects to 
be part of the EU in “just a matter of time” (Vincent, B1)—though the report also 
notes that the EU used the same carrot-and-stick tactic last year, promising quick 
integration to Macedonia, but that country is no closer to belonging than it was. 
Europe would indeed seem to be the promised land for many of the perhaps not 
so formerly Eastern countries; nevertheless, many Balkan citizens in the diaspora, 
like Iordanova, for example, who lives in London, feel that they gave up their 
home for a safety net of Western liberalism, which then turned into a sham. For 
them, there is no utopian epilogue. As Iordanova says, “growing disillusionment 
with this new sphere of belonging resulted in the solitary detachment in which 
most of us live now. What seemed to be an aftermath of Bosnia turned into a 
continuation of the Balkan ordeal” (Iordanova 282).  
I suppose that Otherness can follow us no matter where we go.  
I think back occasionally to my skeptical friend, who couldn’t believe that I 
wanted to go to Hungary for the summer. I hope that she was able to do some 
travelling in her life. I realize, though, that she was probably right to be so dubious 
about Eastern Europe and Hungarians. You see, Hungarians are a barbaric people, 
descended from Asians and Attila, who invaded Europe in A.D. 900, and we all 
know how bad he was. Another name for them was Uigurs or Ugrians, which, 
with the addition over the years of a few other letters, became Hungarian. 
Because these savages were so bloodthirsty and so feared—they were known to 
eat the babies of their enemies, roasted on the end of pitchforks, and they 
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apparently had very bad personal grooming habits—Uigur became the ogre, which 
is still the word used for a horrible man-and-woman-and-baby-and-pet-eating 
monster in many languages. 
Or so the apocryphal story, probably penned by some Enlightenment wonk, 
goes.  
In other words, I hope she got to go to Eastern Europe for some rest and 
deconstruction. 
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E N D N O T E S  
 
1  Though this discussion is primarily about Europe, the terms West and Western generally 
refer to the industrialized nations of Western Europe, as well as the United States and 
Canada. 
2  Normally the Balkans refer to Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Albania. According to Iordanova, “countries such as Croatia, Slovenia, 
Greece, Romania, Moldova and Turkey are also ‘Balkan’ in a number of elements of their 
history, heritage and self-conceptualisation, even though some of them may be, for a 
variety of reasons, positioned differently in the Western imaginary” (Iordanova 6). 
Iordanova goes on to note that, in her schema, the Balkans refers not to a geographical 
concept but to a cultural entity, “widely defined as shared by Byzantine, Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian legacies and by the specific marginal positioning of the region in relation 
to the western part of the European continent.”  
3  European indifference is perhaps best exemplified by the massacre of thousands of civilians 
in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, with UN forces apparently complacently standing by, 
unwilling to heed requests for help even from their own forces within the town. 
(www.hrw.org/summaries.s.bosnia9510.html). 
4  My most recent glimpse of Kusturica was in The Widow of Saint-Pierre (La Veuve de Saint-
Pierre, 2000). Set on the French island of Saint-Pierre, located off the coast of 
Newfoundland, the film is set in 1849 and centers on a progressive couple, played by 
Daniel Auteuil, the military commander of the island, and his wife, played by Juliette 
Binoche. In the opening scene a couple of drunken hooligans, one of whom is played by 
Kusturica, commit a senseless murder. The character played by Kusturica is sentenced to 
die by the guillotine (or veuve, an old French word for guillotine), but there isn’t one on the 
island, so they must send for one from France. In the meantime, the kindly commander’s 
wife becomes a mentor to Kusturica’s rough character, who transforms himself into a 
paragon of virtue. Eventually, after many good deeds he becomes a beloved figure on the 
island. After many months, the guillotine finally arrives and the Kusturica character, so 
good is he, actually helps bring it ashore because he doesn’t want to cause work for others. 
At this stage, the commander refuses to go ahead with the execution, thus leading to his 
own execution in France, to where he is dismissed, and Kusturica has his head chopped off 
(rather, the character he plays does). One critic, Andy Klein, writing in the Los Angeles 
New Times, noted that Kusturica’s on-screen presence and charisma are part of what makes 
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us accept the rapid change in the townspeople’s attitudes towards the reformed murderer. 
Clearly, this charisma failed him with the critics of Underground, and his subsequent film, 
Black Cat, White Cat (1998), was universally panned.  
